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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND THE FUTURE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
MARK L. MOVSESIAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Last term, the Supreme Court decided Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
one of several recent cases in which religious believers have 
sought to avoid the application of public accommodations laws 
that ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.1 Like 
most such disputes, the case involved a small business that 
declined, because of the owner’s religious convictions, to 
provide a service for a same-sex wedding—in this case, 
Colorado cake designer Jack Phillips’s convictions against 
designing and baking a cake for a gay couple, Charlie Craig 
and Dave Mullins.2 In most of these cases, courts have been 
unwilling to exempt businesses from the anti-discrimination 
laws on religious grounds and have ruled in favor of the 
customers. One might have thought Jack Phillips would lose in 
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John’s. I thank Marc DeGirolami, John McGinnis, Micah Schwartzman, and 
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 1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018). For other recent cases, see, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F. 
Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 
(N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 
P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. 
City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). 
 2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop as well. Indeed, many observers were 
surprised that the Court had granted cert in his case at all.3 
Somewhat surprisingly, though, the Supreme Court ruled in 
his favor, on the basis of an argument few observers had 
credited before the Court heard the case.4 In a 7-2 opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, the Court held that, in deciding that Phillips’s 
refusal to create a cake for a same-sex wedding violated the 
state’s anti-discrimination laws, the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission had violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.5 The 
Commission, the Court wrote, had failed to treat Phillips’s 
religious convictions in a neutral and respectful way.6 At least 
two of the commissioners had publicly disparaged Phillips’s 
religious convictions and none of the other commissioners 
present had objected.7 Moreover, the Commission had acted 
inconsistently in at least three prior cases involving other 
bakers who had refused, on grounds of conscience, to create 
cakes with anti-gay marriage sentiments. The Commission had 
ruled that those bakers had acted lawfully in refusing service. 
This inconsistency suggested that the state had not been 
neutral with respect to the substance of Phillips’s convictions. 
Punishing Phillips for refusing, on grounds of conscience, to 
create a pro-gay marriage cake, while failing to punish other 
bakers who declined, on grounds of conscience, to create anti-
gay marriage cakes, suggested that the state simply disfavored 
the content of Phillips’s convictions.8 
Because the Commission had failed to treat Phillips’s 
religious convictions in a neutral and respectful way, the Court 
                                                                                                      
 3. See Amy Howe, Argument preview: Wedding cakes v. religious beliefs?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2017, 3:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/ 
argument- preview-wedding-cakes-v-religious-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/H643-JXRH] 
 4. See Robert W. Tuttle & Ira C. Lupu, Masterpiece Cakeshop—A Troublesome 
Application Of Free Exercise Principles By A Court Determined To Avoid Hard 
Questions, TAKE CARE (June 7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-
cakeshop-a-troublesome-application-of-free-exercise-principles-by-a-court-
determined-to-avoid-hard-questions [https://perma.cc/3Z67-WWY4] (“[M]ost 
observers believed that the Free Exercise Clause issues would not be crucial to the 
disposition of the case.”). 
 5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
 6. Id. at 1729. 
 7. Id. at 1729–30. 
 8. Id. at 1730–31. I discuss the Court’s reasoning on this point further below. See 
infra pp. 720–21. 
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held, its action against him violated the Free Exercise Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.9 The Court stressed that future cases, in 
which state authorities had not demonstrated overt hostility to 
a claimant’s religious convictions, might well reach a different 
result—a fact that Justice Kagan stressed in a concurring 
opinion.10 Masterpiece Cakeshop thus does relatively little to 
resolve the conflict between anti-discrimination laws and the 
right of business owners to decline, out of sincere religious 
conviction, to provide services in connection with same-sex 
weddings.11 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is nonetheless important for what it 
reveals about deeper cultural and political trends, all related, 
that will affect the future course of the law. Two cultural trends 
are important: religious polarization and an expanding concept 
of equality. Over the past two decades, American religion has 
become polarized between two groups, the Nones, who reject 
organized religion as authoritarian and hypocritical, especially 
with respect to sexuality, and the Traditionally Religious, who 
continue to adhere to organized religion and to traditional 
religious teachings, especially with respect to sexuality.12 Each 
group views the other’s values as threatening and 
incomprehensible. Neither is going away, and neither seems in 
a mind to compromise—including in commercial life.13 This 
religious polarization has figured very prominently in the 
public’s response to Masterpiece Cakeshop and similar 
controversies. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop also reflects a second cultural trend, one 
that Alexis de Tocqueville—whose work runs like a red thread 
through our story—saw long ago: an expanding notion of 
                                                                                                      
 9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.  at 1731–32. 
 10. Id. at 1732; id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 11. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) (noting that the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court “ducked 
central questions” in the case). 
 12. On the Nones generally, see Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in 
American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones (Robert Schuman Ctr. for 
Advanced Studies, Research Paper No. 2014/19, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/
 sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399470 [https://perma.cc/8AMF-H3AW]. 
 13. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 183 (2014) 
(observing that, with respect to LGBT issues, “the marketplace itself has become a 
site of social contestation rather than a refuge from the culture wars”). 
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equality.14 Increasing numbers of Americans endorse a 
capacious concept of equality—“equality as sameness”—that 
treats social distinctions, especially religious distinctions, as 
arbitrary and unimportant.15 Asserting the importance of 
religious boundaries, as Jack Phillips did, seems unreasonable 
to growing numbers of our fellow citizens. Asserting such 
boundaries strikes them—as it did Charlie Craig and Dave 
Mullins, and at least some of the Colorado commissioners—as 
deeply insulting, an affront to human dignity. That so many of 
the actors in Masterpiece Cakeshop could not credit Jack 
Phillips’s assertions of good faith explains much of what 
happened in the case, and much of what is likely to happen in 
future cases. 
Finally, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects an important political 
trend: the steady growth of an activist state committed to the 
idea of equality as sameness. At both the federal and state 
level, administrative agencies work to promote equality in all 
areas of life. Their actions increasingly impinge on the 
Traditionally Religious, who face an expanding set of rules and 
policies, backed by serious sanctions, which promote new 
understandings of equality, particularly with respect to sex and 
gender. The actions of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
offer a very good example. Although state officials will not 
likely demonstrate the same overt hostility to traditional 
religious beliefs in future cases, they will likely remain 
committed to the same expansive view of equality. As a result, 
conflicts between our anti-discrimination laws, on the one 
hand, and the religious beliefs of millions of American citizens, 
on the other, will continue. 
As Tocqueville famously observed, American political 
questions inevitably become judicial ones.16 Conflicts like the 
one in Masterpiece Cakeshop will continue to find their way into 
                                                                                                      
 14. On Tocqueville and equality, see infra at 731–32. 
 15. See Samuel Gregg, Equality in Democracy: Tocqueville’s Prediction of a Falling 
America, CNS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/
 commentary/samuel-gregg/equality-democracy-tocquevilles-prediction-falling-
america [https://perma.cc/S8LN-TKCR]. 
 16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA I.ii.8, at 257 (Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840) 
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA] (“There is almost no political question in 
the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question”). 
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our courts. How will the courts resolve them? The law with 
respect to religious accommodations is currently something of 
a “patchwork.”17 Different jurisdictions employ different tests 
in different circumstances. Nonetheless, the leading test 
remains the so-called “compelling interest” test, which holds 
that the government may impose a substantial burden on a 
person’s religious exercise only if the government has a 
compelling interest in doing so and has chosen the least 
restrictive means.18 Notwithstanding Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
somewhat unusual resolution, the compelling interest test will 
probably determine the outcome in most future cases. 
But the compelling interest test presents significant 
difficulties.19 The test turns controversies about religious 
accommodation into judgment calls, the outcomes of which 
depend, practically speaking, on the intuitions of the people 
doing the judging.20 In a polarized society like ours, with 
deeply divergent understandings about the nature and value of 
religion and the scope of equality, intuitions about “substantial 
burden” and “compelling interest” vary widely from person to 
person—and from judge to judge.21 The test makes it very hard 
to predict what result will obtain in any particular case and 
makes judges’ identity, background, and prior normative 
                                                                                                      
 17. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 
(2016). 
 18. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 
107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012)). On the current 
status of the compelling interest test, see MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 198. 
See also W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: 
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 231 (2010). I discuss 
the compelling interest test further below. See infra pp. 745–47. 
 19. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting the compelling 
interest test for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause); see also William P. Marshall, 
Bad Statutes Make Bad Law, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (reviewing problems with the 
compelling interest test). 
 20. See Mark L. Movsesian, The Powerful Headwinds Confronting Religious Freedom, 
L. & LIBERTY (May 2, 2018), https:// www.lawliberty.org/ 2018/05/02/masterpiece-
cakeshop-religious-freedom-nones/ [https://perma.cc/FC7F-LUTF]. 
 21. In a related context, David Bernstein has written that the compelling interest 
test may only serve as “an empty vessel for the justices’ moral intuitions.” David 
E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
133, 167 (discussing freedom of association). 
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commitments signally important.22 In short, the cultural and 
political trends I have identified—growing religious 
polarization, an expanded concept of equality, and an activist 
state—suggest that conflicts between anti-discrimination norms 
and the religious beliefs of millions of Americans will, if 
anything, grow more frequent and bitter and that courts will 
continue to have to resolve them. And the vague nature of the 
compelling interest test suggests that the ultimate legal 
resolution will remain unclear for a long time to come. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Court’s 
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Part II explores the cultural 
and political trends I have identified and shows how the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop litigation reflects them. Part III concludes 
and ventures three predictions: conflicts like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop will grow more frequent and harder for our society to 
negotiate; the law in this area will remain unsettled and deeply 
contested; and the judicial confirmation wars will grow even 
more bitter and partisan than they already are. 
One clarification at the start: this Article is analytical rather 
than normative. For what it is worth, Masterpiece Cakeshop 
struck me as a difficult case. But my goal here is not to argue 
the merits. Rather, I seek to illuminate the issues and make 
some predictions about the future course of the law. Those 
predictions may turn out to be wrong. But their correctness 
does not depend on one’s views about which side should 
prevail in the clash of important values that Masterpiece 
Cakeshop represents: our society’s commitments both to non-
discrimination and to religious freedom. 
I. THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP DECISION 
Masterpiece Cakeshop presents what has become a familiar 
pattern in American commercial life. A gay couple asks a 
vendor to provide services in connection with the couple’s 
wedding—photography, flowers, invitations—which the 
                                                                                                      
 22. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University 
Policies Against Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 393–94 (1994) (observing that 
the balancing contemplated by the compelling interest test “invites judges to put 
their personal values onto the scale”). 
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vendor refuses on the basis of his religious convictions.23 
Providing services for a gay wedding, he explains, would make 
him complicit in conduct he considers sinful.24 The couple 
objects that the vendor is denying service in violation of state 
public-accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. The vendor responds that he is 
willing to provide services to all customers, including the 
couple, whether they are gay or straight. But he declines to 
participate in gay weddings, because gay weddings violate his 
religious beliefs. 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a gay couple, Charlie Craig and Dave 
Mullins, asked a Colorado cake designer, Jack Phillips—the 
owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop—to create a cake for their 
wedding celebration.25 The couple didn’t specify exactly what 
they wished the cake to say, or, in fact, whether they wanted an 
inscription on the cake at all.26 But they did want a custom cake 
that Phillips would design especially for their wedding. They 
were not interested in the off-the-shelf baked goods that 
Phillips offered to sell them.27 
Phillips, a conservative Christian with traditional views 
about marriage, declined to fill their order, explaining that 
creating a cake for a gay wedding would violate his religious 
convictions. Creating such a cake, he said, would amount to his 
“participat[ing] in” and “personally endors[ing]” a relationship 
he considered unbiblical.28 Indeed, the subsequent 
investigation by the state civil rights authorities revealed that 
Phillips had a policy against creating cakes for gay weddings 
and had declined to do so several times in the past.29 He had 
also refused, out of religious conviction, “to bake cakes 
                                                                                                      
 23. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 133–34 (discussing cases). 
 24. On complicity claims generally, compare Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, 
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 
YALE L.J. 2516 (2015), with Joshua J. Craddock, The Case for Complicity-Based 
Religious Accommodations, 12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018). 
 25. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1724 (2018). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1726. 
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containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, 
cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween.”30 
Shortly after Phillips rejected their order, Craig and Mullins 
began an administrative action against him (and Masterpiece 
Cakeshop) by filing a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights 
Division, the state agency responsible for enforcing Colorado’s 
Anti-Discrimination Act, or CADA.31 Like many similar laws 
across the country, CADA prohibits places of public 
accommodation from refusing customers equal service on the 
basis of sexual orientation, among other things.32 The Division 
investigated Phillips, found probable cause that he had 
violated CADA, and referred the case to another state agency, 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which in turn referred 
the case to an administrative law judge, who held a hearing 
and determined that Phillips had violated CADA by 
discriminating against Craig and Mullins on the basis of sexual 
orientation.33 
Phillips appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Commission itself, 
which held two public meetings in his case. At both meetings, 
but especially at the second, individual commissioners made 
remarks dismissing and disparaging Phillips’s religious 
convictions.34 One commissioner suggested that, if Phillips’s 
religious beliefs prevented him from complying with 
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law, Phillips might find another 
place to do business.35 Another likened Phillips’s stance to 
historical episodes in which religion had been used to justify 
violent acts of oppression, including slavery and the 
Holocaust.36 This commissioner described Phillips’s religious 
objection to same-sex marriage as simply a way to injure gay 
                                                                                                      
 30. Id. at 1745 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 31. Id. at 1725 (majority opinion). 
 32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018). 
 33. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
 34. Id. at 1729. 
 35. The “commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to 
believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the 
state.’ A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: ‘[I]f a 
businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the 
law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to 
compromise.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
 36. Id. 
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people and “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric 
people can use.”37 The Supreme Court made much of these 
remarks in its eventual decision. 
The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and ruled 
against Phillips.38 It ordered him to stop refusing orders for 
wedding cakes from gay couples and to provide 
“comprehensive staff training” at his shop on CADA and on 
the requirements of the Commission’s ruling against him.39 In 
addition, it required him to file compliance reports with the 
Commission on a quarterly basis for two years. The reports 
were to provide the Commission with details about how many 
people Phillips had refused to serve and the reasons for his 
refusals, among other things.40 
When the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected his appeal of 
the Commission’s order, Phillips sought review in the United 
States Supreme Court, arguing that requiring him to create 
wedding cakes for gay couples violated both his free speech 
and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.41 When 
the Supreme Court granted review, most observers thought the 
Court would focus on Phillips’s free speech claim. His free 
exercise claim seemed precluded by the Court’s landmark 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that the 
Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a neutral, generally 
applicable law that incidentally burdens a citizen’s religious 
exercise.42 CADA certainly seemed to be such a law: it 
amounted to a blanket prohibition on discrimination in places 
of public accommodation, whether the motivation for the 
discrimination was religious or not.43 Further, the Court’s Civil 
                                                                                                      
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1726. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Brief for Petitioners at 14–15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111). 
 42. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 43. In relevant part, CADA provides: 
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or 
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, 
because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital 
status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the 
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Rights Era jurisprudence suggested that, at least with respect to 
racial discrimination, religious objections would not exempt 
public accommodations from anti-discrimination laws.44 To 
most observers, Phillips’s chance of succeeding on a free 
exercise claim seemed remote.45 
 Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Court ruled, 7-2, that 
the Commission had violated Phillips’s free exercise rights, not 
so much in its ultimate decision against him, but in its decision-
making process. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
explained that the Free Exercise Clause gave Phillips the right 
to a neutral decision maker.46 But the Commission had not been 
neutral at all. In fact, it had shown a clear bias against him—
that is, against his sincere religious beliefs. As evidence, Justice 
Kennedy adduced the commissioners’ official comments in the 
case, especially the remark about the “despicable” nature of 
Phillips’s religious convictions against same-sex weddings.47 In 
addition, he noted that the Commission had in prior cases 
allowed bakers to decline, on the basis of conscience, 
customers’ orders for cakes with messages opposing gay 
marriage. This disparate treatment suggested that the 
Commission had ruled against Phillips simply because the 
Commission was hostile to the substance of Phillips’s religious 
views.48 
Because the Commission had not shown neutrality with 
respect to Phillips’s sincere religious beliefs, Justice Kennedy 
concluded, its decision against him violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.49 This conclusion, too, was a bit of a surprise, since it 
seemed to leave out a step. Most commentators had 
understood the Court’s 1993 decision in Church of Lukumi 
                                                                                                      
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a 
place of public accommodation. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017). 
 44. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam). 
 45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 46. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 47. Id. at 1729. For an argument that the Court misinterpreted these comments, 
see Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 135. 
 48. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31. 
 49. Id. at 1731–32. 
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Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah50 to require strict scrutiny in 
circumstances where the state had not been neutral with 
respect to religion: a state could burden religion in a non-
neutral way only for a compelling reason and through the least 
restrictive means of doing so.51 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch 
assumed as much in his concurring opinion, which applied the 
compelling interest test to invalidate the Commission’s 
decision.52 But Justice Kennedy skipped the compelling interest 
analysis altogether. 
Justice Kennedy also left unresolved the question of what 
would happen if a state agency did not demonstrate overt bias 
against a claimant’s religion. Presumably, in many cases in 
which state agencies apply anti-discrimination laws to vendors, 
officials do not make on-the-record comments disparaging the 
vendors’ sincere religious convictions, and do not have a 
record of ruling inconsistently in prior disputes.53 The Court 
would decide any such future cases, Justice Kennedy said, on 
the basis of the particular circumstances.54 About the only 
guidance the Court was willing to give was this: courts would 
have to strike a balance between the right of religious persons 
to have their beliefs respected and the right of gay persons to 
obtain goods and services in the marketplace without suffering 
affronts.55 
Masterpiece Cakeshop ultimately settled fairly little, and the 
fight over future cases already has begun.56 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                      
 50. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 51. Id. at 546; see also, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: 
Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 375 (2010). 
 52. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 53. Cf. Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 150 (“Going forward, state 
civil rights enforcement agencies have the chance to try again, while avoiding the 
mistakes of the [Colorado] Commission.”). 
 54. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Only two weeks after the Court ruled in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission sanctioned Jack Phillips for refusing to create a cake for 
a transgender celebration. See Amy B. Wang, Baker claims religious persecution 
again—this time after denying cake for transgender woman, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/08/15/baker-
claims-religious-persecution-again-this-time-after-denying-cake-for-transgender-
woman/ [https://perma.cc/A4MN-NZGK]. The Commission ultimately 
determined not to move forward with the case, as part of a settlement with 
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separate opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggest where the 
battle lines may be drawn for the many complicated issues 
future cases will raise.57 Still, although it did not resolve 
matters, the decision reveals important cultural and political 
trends that will likely drive future cases. I turn to those trends 
now. 
II. CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN MASTERPIECE 
CAKESHOP 
A. Religious Polarization: The Nones vs. the 
Traditionally Religious 
Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects two important cultural trends. 
The first is a growing polarization between two groups in 
American religious life: the Nones and the Traditionally 
Religious. The second is an expanding notion of equality, one 
that goes beyond the anti-discrimination norms of the Civil 
Rights Movement, which opposed the state’s differential 
treatment of persons on the basis of race and other 
characteristics, to a more general rejection of social distinctions, 
especially including those grounded in religion. This Article 
addresses each of these trends in turn. 
The rise of the Nones is perhaps the most talked-about 
development in American sociology in the last decade.58 
“Nones” are those people who describe their religion in 
surveys as “none” or “nothing in particular”—people who say 
they have no religious affiliation at all.59 According to the most 
recent Pew Research Center study in 2014, about 23% of 
Americans adults now fall within this category, an increase of 
about seven percent from the previous survey in 2007.60 In 
                                                                                                      
Phillips. Chris Mills Rodrigo, State of Colorado, baker in same-sex wedding case agree 
to end litigation, THE HILL (Mar. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-
battles/432722-state-of-colorado-baker-in-same-sex-wedding-case-agree-to-end. 
 57. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1734 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 58. Much of this discussion of the Nones derives from my earlier work. 
Movsesian, supra note 12. 
 59. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 1. 
 60. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 20 (2015) 
[hereinafter AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE], 
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historical terms, this percentage is extremely large. In the 1950s, 
only three percent of Americans said they had no religious 
identity.61 According to the Pew survey, Nones now qualify as 
the second largest “religious” group in the country, after 
Protestants and ahead of Catholics—though, when aggregated, 
Christian faiths still claim the large majority of Americans, 
about 70%.62 
Among Millennials, the percentage of Nones is significantly 
higher than in the general population. Pew divides Millennials 
into two cohorts, “Older Millennials,” born between the years 
1981 and 1989, and “Younger Millennials,” born between the 
years 1990 and 1996.63 Among Older Millenials, the percentage 
of Nones is 34%, up nine points from 2007; among Younger 
Millennials, the percentage is even higher—36%.64 These 
numbers are significant because of what sociologists refer to as 
the “generational replacement” effect.65 As older Americans 
with relatively strong religious commitments die off, younger, 
less affiliated Americans gradually will take their place. As a 
result, over time, Nones will make up an increasingly large 
percentage of the population. It is true that people often 
become more religious as they age, and today’s Millennials 
may do so as well. At the moment, though, they are not 
following that pattern. In terms of indicators such as church 
attendance and prayer, older Millennials “are, if anything, less 
religiously observant today than they were” just seven years 
ago.66 
To be sure, some sociologists question whether the 
percentages are really as high as these surveys indicate.67 
Baylor University sociologist Rodney Stark, for example, 
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believes that surveys overstate the numbers of Nones in 
America today; some respondents apparently list their religion 
as “None” to indicate that “they do not belong to a specific 
church”—that is, when they are non-denominational 
Christians.68 (Some anecdotal evidence: When I presented an 
earlier version of this Article at a conference at the Notre Dame 
Center on Ethics and Culture, one audience member 
approached me afterwards to say that he would describe 
himself as a “None,” even though he was a Christian, precisely 
because he had never formally joined any church 
congregation). Whatever the precise numbers may be, most 
sociologists take the rise of the Nones to be a “‘highly reliable’ 
statistical finding” with implications for the future of American 
religion.69 
Most Nones do not reject religious belief as such. The 
majority of them in the 2014 Pew survey, 61%, say they believe 
in God or a universal spirit—though that percentage represents 
a decline from the 2007 survey, which showed that 70% of 
Nones believed in God.70 About a third of Nones say that 
religion is somewhat or very important in their lives—though, 
again, that percentage is down a great deal since 2007, which 
suggests that Nones are becoming more secular over time.71 
What most characterizes Nones is a rejection of institutional 
religion. The Nones are spiritual “Independents” who refuse to 
join formal, authoritative religious communities, which they 
see as coercive and stifling.72 Instead, Nones believe they can 
fashion their own, personal religions from a variety of different 
traditions—indeed, from traditions which present themselves 
as opposed to one another. As Ross Douthat writes, the 
memoirist Elizabeth Gilbert, whose bestseller, Eat Pray Love 
helped popularize the concept of “spiritual but not religious” 
in the first decade of this century, created her own, personal 
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spirituality by combining elements from Hindu polytheism, 
Christian monotheism, and Buddhist non-theism.73 
Nones believe they can do this sort of thing for two reasons. 
First, they reject the idea that any one religious tradition can be 
uniquely true to the exclusion of all others. Exclusive claims of 
religious authority strike them as an affront to reason and good 
sense, as well as human freedom.74 Second, they believe that 
the individual has the right to pick and choose among various 
traditions and forge a spiritual path that works for him, 
because the individual has God within him.75 Spiritual 
enlightenment and peace come, not from submitting to external 
religious authority, which inevitably squelches spiritual 
authenticity, but from discerning and accepting the divine 
guidance that exists within oneself.76 The individual, not the 
religious community, has the right to judge what is true—or, at 
least, what is true for him. 
Religious Independents have always been part of American 
life.77 In the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine wrote, “My own 
mind is my own church,”78 a sentiment many twenty-first 
century Nones share. And the nineteenth-century 
Transcendentalists sound, to today’s ears, a great deal like 
Nones.79 In the past, though, this sort of religious idiosyncrasy 
was essentially a fringe phenomenon.80 Today, by contrast, 
Nones make up the second largest religious group in America, 
and roughly a third of Millennials. For large numbers of our 
fellow citizens, the conventional understanding of religion “as 
a distinctive body of beliefs, a moral and ritual set of practices, 
and the organizational structures surrounding ideas and ideals 
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of the sacred,” no longer represents the norm.81 In fact, for 
these citizens, traditional religion represents a malign force that 
stifles authentic spirituality, creating inner turmoil and 
preventing individuals from attaining their true potential. 
Why should the rise of the Nones occur now, at the start of 
the twenty-first century? Many factors exist, but three merit 
special attention. First, there are demographic explanations. 
Changes in family structure, and, in particular, high rates of 
religious intermarriage and divorce have an important role. 
About half of Americans who marry today choose a spouse of a 
different religion.82 More than a quarter of Millennials say they 
were raised in a religiously mixed family.83 As one would 
expect, children from such families more often become Nones 
when they grow up than children whose parents shared the 
same religion.84 Moreover, Nones are themselves having and 
raising children. Roughly one-quarter of Millennials in the Pew 
survey report having been raised by at least one parent who 
was a None; about six percent say both their parents were 
Nones.85 A large percentage of these children also become 
Nones when they reach adulthood—62% percent where both 
parents were Nones.86 Parental divorce also appears to have a 
role. Children of divorce are significantly less likely to identify 
with a religion than children from intact families, perhaps 
because they have less trust in institutions and authority 
figures generally.87 
Second, the rise of the Nones seems to be associated with the 
Sexual Revolution, especially with changing views on 
homosexuality. According to a 2017 Pew report, a solid 
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majority of Americans, about 62% percent, now say that same-
sex marriage should be legal.88 Among Nones, however, the 
percentage is strikingly high—85%.89 Here again, Millennials 
are key. Young adults are driving the changing social 
consensus on homosexuality, including among Nones. 
Millennials generally have more positive views of 
homosexuality than older Americans, and nearly 90% of 
Millennial Nones say that society should accept 
homosexuality.90 The Pew report also offers support for what 
sociologists have been saying for years: young Nones dislike 
organized religion because they associate it with traditional, 
negative views about homosexuality, and because they believe 
organized religion’s rejection of homosexuality masks 
hypocrisy about sexual sins generally.91 
Finally, the rise of the Nones in the twenty-first century may 
reflect the gradual, but inevitable, working-out of the inner 
logic of liberalism, America’s dominant political ideology. In 
the nineteenth century, Tocqueville wrote that escaping the 
hold of habit, family, and tradition were among the principal 
features of the American mindset.92 More recently, Patrick 
Deneen has observed that liberalism has always opposed 
received authority, which it views as arbitrary and accidental, 
in favor of individual autonomy and choice. Liberalism teaches 
that loosening the bonds of family, community, and religion is 
necessary in order to release the full potential of human 
beings.93 Liberalism encourages the person to think of himself 
as “primarily a free chooser” with respect to “all relationships, 
institutions, and beliefs.”94 Over time, the ethos of choice 
extends to more and more subjects. It is no surprise, then, in a 
society where liberalism dominates, that many people 
eventually come to see choice as extending to religious 
institutions and beliefs. 
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Nonetheless, the rise of the Nones does not mean that 
religion is simply disappearing from American life. The 
increase in the number of the religiously unaffiliated is 
occurring simultaneously with an increase in religiosity among 
Americans who do maintain a religious identity—a group one 
might call the Traditionally Religious. According to the 2014 
Pew survey, religiously affiliated Americans “appear to have 
grown more religiously observant in recent years,” if one 
considers things like Bible study and prayer groups.95 Another 
recent survey shows that the percentage of “intensely 
religious” Americans, with intensity being measured in terms 
of indicators such as church attendance and frequent prayer, 
has remained remarkably stable for decades.96 The percentage 
of Americans with a “strong” religious affiliation has remained 
steady, at a little less than 40%, since 1989.97 
In other words, America is experiencing a deepening 
religious polarization rather than a systematic falloff from 
religion. The growing percentage of Nones does not result from 
a general decrease in religious observance, but “a dramatic 
decline” in the numbers of the “moderately religious”—people 
who formally identify with a religion but who show only 
modest levels of commitment.98 As in so many areas of 
American life, the middle is dropping out in favor of the 
extremes on either end. The moderately religious are rapidly 
ending their affiliations and becoming Nones, while the 
Traditionally Religious are maintaining their affiliations or 
even increasing their intensity. We appear to be reaching a 
point of rough parity. More than a fifth of Americans, and 
more than a third of younger Americans, are now Nones, while 
something like two-fifths of Americans are among the 
Traditionally Religious. 
This deepening polarization will exacerbate conflicts like the 
one in Masterpiece Cakeshop and make it harder for our society 
to negotiate them. Compromise requires an ability to 
sympathize with the other side, to understand, even if one does 
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not share, the commitments that motivate one’s interlocutor. It 
requires some common base of experience. Americans have not 
always shown such sympathy for minority religious 
communities, of course. At various times, Catholics, Jews, and 
Mormons all have experienced hostility, among other religious 
groups. But a general sympathy for religion and religious 
claims has always marked American culture. In the past, 
someone like Jack Phillips might have counted on a 
widespread, if thin, sympathy with the idea of traditional 
religious commitments. The vast majority of Americans would 
have understood why he thought it so important to follow the 
tenets of his religion, for the simple reason that the vast 
majority of Americans would have had some connection with 
institutional religion. Even if they were only nominally 
religious, and even if they disagreed with his particular 
convictions, most Americans would have understood why 
Phillips insisted on acting as he did. 
But this wider social sympathy for traditional religion is 
fading. Large numbers of Americans no longer have experience 
with traditional, organized religion—and, to the extent they do 
have such experience, they reject it. Nones are unlikely to 
respond sympathetically when the Traditionally Religious seek 
exemptions from legal requirements.99 Indeed, Nones are likely 
to see such exemptions as an unfair advantage for organized 
religion. For their part, the Traditionally Religious are also 
unlikely to sympathize with the worldview of the Nones. 
Disagreements between the two groups will likely be amplified 
by the fact that Nones overwhelmingly reject traditional 
teachings on sexuality, which they see as psychologically 
damaging and essentially unjust, while the Traditionally 
Religious continue to endorse them as necessary for human 
dignity.100 In short, we now have two fairly sizable, competing 
groups with sharply divergent understandings of the 
beneficence of traditional religious commitments, especially 
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with respect to sexuality—and neither group seems especially 
interested in compromise.101 
The public response to controversies like Masterpiece Cakeshop 
reflects this religious polarization. In the summer of 2016, while 
the Court was considering Jack Phillips’s cert petition, the Pew 
Research Center surveyed Americans’ opinions on whether a 
business should be obligated to provide services for a gay 
wedding notwithstanding the owner’s religious objections.102 
The responses closely tracked America’s religious divide. 
About two-thirds of the religiously unaffiliated—the Nones—
said that a business should be required by law to provide 
services for a gay wedding even if the owner had religious 
objections.103 About two-thirds of Americans who attend 
religious services frequently—the Traditionally Religious—said 
that a business owner should not be required to do so.104 Only a 
relatively small number of Americans, 18%, found it possible to 
sympathize with both sides’ points of view.105 This sharp 
religious divide suggests that achieving social consensus on 
cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop will be extremely difficult. 
B. Equality as Sameness 
Masterpiece Cakeshop also reflects a second cultural trend: 
society’s expanding conception of equality. Equality has been 
central to the American worldview ever since Jefferson 
enshrined the concept in the Declaration of Independence. But 
equality can mean different things. According to one 
understanding, it refers to legal equality—to the fair and 
uniform application of the law to all citizens.106 In the twentieth 
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century, America gradually extended legal equality to racial 
and other minorities against whom it had discriminated, in 
law, for centuries. This has been one of the great achievements 
of our time. 
However, equality can also refer to a broader unwillingness 
to accept any distinctions among groups and individuals, 
whether “material, social, or personal.”107 According to this 
view, equality means a rejection of the idea of “difference per 
se.”108 All boundaries that distinguish one group of people 
from another—for example, beliefs and practices that mark out 
a religious community and exclude non-members—are 
presumptively suspect because of the implicit judgments they 
suggest. Some groups apparently think their beliefs and ways 
of life are superior to others. Such judgments seem impolite, 
ungenerous, and inconsistent with the spirit of true equality, 
which requires that each community acknowledge the basic 
correctness and good will of all others. Suggesting that one 
finds others’ beliefs and practices morally inferior is, on this 
view, a grave affront to human dignity. Notwithstanding 
societal claims to respect diversity, it is this second concept of 
equality—“equality as sameness”109—that pervades our culture 
today, especially with respect to religion. 
Once again, Tocqueville saw this coming. Equality, he 
observed, was Americans’ most fundamental moral 
commitment, the criterion by which we judged everything 
else.110 Equality required that social distinctions be ignored—
between aristocrats and common men, the educated and the 
unschooled, man and woman, parent and child. In law, it 
called for uniformity;111 in philosophy and religion, for 
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generality rather than a focus on the particular.112 In fact, with 
respect to religion, the preference for generality ultimately 
worked to minimize distinctions between particular faith 
traditions and promote pantheism, which not only denied the 
relevance of difference in the created order, but also the 
distinction between creation and the Creator Himself.113 
The emphasis on religious equality did not result in 
widespread pantheism in Tocqueville’s time. Christianity had 
too powerful a hold on nineteenth-century Americans for that 
to happen.114 Today, however, his predictions seem to be 
coming true. Americans are remarkably broad-minded about 
the legitimacy of all religions. A 2010 study by sociologists 
Robert Putnam and David Campbell reveals that almost 90% of 
Americans believe that members of other religions, not only 
their own, can go to Heaven.115 Nuances exist, and much 
depends on how people understand the question. The 
percentage goes down, for example, when surveyors ask 
Christians whether non-Christians (as opposed to different 
kinds of Christians) can go to Heaven.116 And much depends 
on how respondents understand the question. Some Christians 
would say, for example, that Christianity is the unique path to 
salvation, but members of other faiths may be on the path 
without knowing it. Other Christians would say that it’s 
possible for non-Christians to go to Heaven, but rare. Still, it is 
noteworthy that the large majority of American Christians, 
even those who belong to churches that teach that Christianity 
is the exclusive path to salvation, believe that non-Christians 
can, in principle, receive eternal life. 
Putnam and Campbell ascribe this remarkable ecumenism to 
a number of factors, including the large number of mixed-
religious families in America, which tend to mute religious 
distinctions (how could my saintly “Aunt Susan” not go to 
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Heaven just because she’s not a Christian?), and the inevitable 
social interactions between people from different religions in 
daily life (“My Friend Al” is an evangelical Christian, but he’s 
not a bad guy).117 These explanations seem to have things 
backwards: it is the norm of tolerance that lets Aunt Susan 
marry into the family in the first place, and allows one to have 
a friend from a different faith tradition. Whatever the reasons, 
when it comes to perhaps the most important religious 
question of all, Americans show a remarkably latitudinarian 
attitude. With respect to attaining salvation, and with the 
qualifications I suggest above, most Americans seem to believe 
that all ways are equally good. 
One the one hand, the concept of equality as sameness may 
make conflicts like the one in Masterpiece Cakeshop less likely. If 
people perceive all ways as equally good, they will not have 
problems participating in all sorts of celebrations, whatever 
their religious convictions. On the other hand, when such 
conflicts do occur, an expansive concept of equality will make 
them more bitter and harder to resolve. To refuse to participate 
in someone else’s wedding on religious grounds is to erect a 
boundary that seems socially incomprehensible. It is to express 
a judgment that the life events of other citizens are so 
opprobrious that one cannot take part in them. Such a 
judgment violates the principle of “equality as sameness” and, 
as a result, is likely to be taken as a deep insult to the dignity of 
other citizens. 
If I may offer a personal anecdote, I recently posed a 
hypothetical case in my Law and Religion class.118 Suppose, I 
asked the students, an observant Jew has a florist shop. One 
day, a customer, who is also Jewish, comes to the shop to say 
she’s getting married and would like the florist to do the 
wedding. “That’s wonderful,” the florist says. “Where will you 
get married?” The customer replies that the wedding will be at 
a local nondenominational church, because her fiancé is 
Christian, and she, the customer, isn’t very observant. The 
florist thinks about it and says, “I’m so sorry, but I can’t do 
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your wedding. It’s nothing personal; I’m sure your fiancé is a 
fine person, as are you. It’s just that as an observant Jew, I don’t 
approve of interfaith weddings. For our community to survive, 
we must avoid intermarriage and assimilation. Please 
understand. There are many other florists who can do your 
wedding. I’ll even suggest some. But I can’t, in good 
conscience, participate.” What result? 
In posing this hypothetical, I was trying to show the students 
that these are complicated questions and that they need to 
consider both sides. Much to my surprise, the students were 
uniformly unsympathetic to the florist. There should be no 
legal right to decline services in this situation, they told me: the 
florist was not acting reasonably and in good faith. I pressed 
them. Didn’t they see that genuine religious diversity requires 
respect for difference, that difference implies boundaries, and 
that boundaries necessarily exclude? Couldn’t a member of a 
minority religion believe, in good faith, that her community 
faced assimilation and decline to run her business in a way that 
promoted it? Wasn’t that a concern worthy of respect? No, they 
told me. The florist in my hypothetical case should have no 
right to turn away the interfaith couple. 
I have thought about the students’ reaction, and it seems to 
me that it results from the students’ sense that it is wrong to 
draw religious distinctions that exclude others and injure their 
dignity, no matter what the justification. That is what the florist 
did in my hypothetical case—and that, I think, was what 
bothered the students. The florist was violating the “equality as 
sameness” principle, and my students simply did not think her 
concerns justified her in doing so. 
Something similar, I believe, occurred in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
itself. Craig and Mullins viewed Phillips’s objection to creating 
their wedding cake as an insult, no matter how much he 
protested about the good will he bore them, and no matter how 
willing he was to sell them goods off the shelf.119 They 
experienced an affront so deep that, rather than obtain a cake 
somewhere else, as they easily could have done, they sought 
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vindication by the state and pursued a lengthy litigation.120 
And the members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
agreed with them about the depth of the insult, especially the 
one commissioner who compared Phillips’s objections to 
historical episodes like slavery and the Holocaust.121 Like the 
florist in my classroom hypothetical, Phillips had violated the 
“equality as sameness” principle. His claim that he could not in 
good conscience participate in a gay wedding, because that 
would make him complicit in activity his religion regarded as 
sinful, erected a boundary that increasing numbers of 
Americans find rebarbative.122 
C. The Activist State 
The third trend that Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects is a political 
one: the rise of activist administrative agencies at both the 
federal and state levels. The growth of government over the 
course of the twentieth century, starting with the Progressives 
in the early 1900s, picking up steam in the New Deal of the 
1930s, and continuing in the Great Society of the 1960s, has 
been much discussed.123 Notwithstanding occasional resistance 
by Presidents and governors, the welfare state, “characterized 
by a high level of government action in all phases of economic 
and social life,” is an inescapable fact of contemporary 
American politics.124 Government rules affect virtually every 
aspect of our society, including commerce, communications, 
consumer transactions, education (at all levels), employment, 
food, health and safety, land use, and professional 
qualifications. 
The expanding scope of the federal government illustrates 
the trend. Since the so-called “New Deal Settlement” of the 
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1930s, the federal government has had more or less plenary 
legislative power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.125 
The Court has occasionally suggested, most recently in the first 
Obamacare case, some limits to the Commerce Clause power, 
but it has not reconsidered the basic understanding.126 The 
Court has also allowed Congress effectively unlimited 
discretion in delegating authority to executive branch agencies, 
and has allowed those agencies considerable discretion in 
interpreting congressional mandates.127 As a result, “[t]here is 
now virtually no significant aspect of life that is not in some 
way regulated by the federal government.”128 Federal “agencies 
wield immense influence in shaping the conduct of individuals 
and organizations.”129 
Numbers tell part of the story. Consider federal government 
expenditures, which serve as a rough proxy for the state’s 
growing role in the American economy. If we focus on 
entitlement spending—programs like Medicare and Social 
Security—the increase since the New Deal is remarkable. 
Adjusting for inflation and population growth, the federal 
government spends about fifteen times more today on 
entitlements than it did in 1940.130 Federal spending on 
entitlements far outstrips spending on other government 
functions, such as national defense.131 Or consider another 
number, the page count of the Federal Register, “the daily 
repository of all proposed and final federal rules and 
                                                                                                      
 125. On the “New Deal Settlement,” see Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. 
Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 126. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). For a good 
overview of the doctrine, see Solum, supra note 125. 
 127. On delegation, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). On agency deference, see id. at 1247; Jeffrey 
A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 799, 802–04 (2010). 
 128. Lawson, supra note 127, at 1236. 
 129. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 112, 114 (2011). 
 130. WILLIAM VOEGELI, NEVER ENOUGH: AMERICA’S LIMITLESS WELFARE STATE 
25 (2010). Voegeli’s figures exclude veterans’ programs and benefits, id. at 22, and 
measure the years 1940–2007. 
 131. See id. at 31–33. 
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regulations.”132 The Federal Register for the year 2016 came to 
almost 100,000 pages, “the highest level in its history,” about 
20% higher than the previous year’s edition.133 Page counts are 
an imperfect measure of government activity, of course.134 But, 
as a rough guide, they do indicate the increasing activity of 
federal agencies. And, again, these numbers relate only to the 
federal government, not to state governments, which retain 
plenary legislative jurisdiction in our constitutional system. 
To be sure, the current administration has announced a 
deregulation campaign at the federal level—“a fundamental 
shift” in policy which, among other things, directs “federal 
agencies to eliminate two regulations for each new one 
implemented and to reduce new regulatory costs to zero.”135 As 
Adam White writes, however, this “very, very good start” faces 
substantial obstacles, including inevitable legal challenges.136 
Moreover, “the next Democratic administration could undo 
much of the Trump administration’s deregulatory effort every 
bit as quickly as the Trump administration undid the Obama 
administration’s regulatory actions.”137 It will take more than a 
few years of deregulation to stop the expansion of 
government—and the current efforts at the federal level will 
have no impact at all at the state level. Claims that “the era of 
big government is over” have misled people in the past.138 
                                                                                                      
 132. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TEN 
THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL 
REGULATORY STATE 16 (2017), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/
 Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DKC-
BULV]; see also MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 77 (using page count of 
Federal Register to illustrate growth of government). 
 133. CREWS, supra note 132, at 3, 16. 
 134. Id. at 16. 
 135. NEOMI RAO, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE FALL 2017 REGULATORY PLAN (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/ jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201710/VPStatement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/73C2-BCQU]. 
 136. Adam J. White, Trumping the Administrative State, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 
19, 2018, 4:25 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/trumping-
the-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/HJ62-FG8U]. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, One(?) Nation Overextended, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1120 (2014). 
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The growth of activist administrative agencies figures 
prominently in controversies like Masterpiece Cakeshop. In part, 
it is simply a matter of volume. The more regulations, and the 
more subjects covered, the greater the potential for businesses 
to violate the law.139 As Marc DeGirolami writes, where 
“government assumes an increasingly large role in the life of 
the citizenry, more injuries are transformed into legally (and 
perhaps even constitutionally) cognizable rights.”140 But the 
volume of regulation alone does not explain things. The 
content matters, too. For reasons I will explain, administrative 
agencies inherently tend to favor the expansive concept of 
equality I have described. As a consequence, conflicts between 
the administrative state and the Traditionally Religious are apt 
to occur much more frequently. 
Once again, Tocqueville offers useful insights as to why this 
should be so. Egalitarian democracies, he believed, tend to 
encourage a powerful state—because they promote an 
individualism that is unsustainable without it.141 In a 
democracy, the individual learns to rely on his own judgment, 
not received wisdom, in making his life choices.142 He learns to 
see himself as equal to everyone else; he sees no reason to defer 
to other people’s judgments or to the wisdom of traditional 
authority.143 But this individualism, paradoxically, promotes a 
powerful state. The individual will from time to time feel his 
weakness and need the help of others. Subjecting oneself to 
one’s equals, or to traditional authority, would be unthinkable; 
but subjecting oneself to a state that stands alone above 
                                                                                                      
 139. See Epstein, supra note 124, at 375; see also MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 77 (“In a society that is pervasively regulated as ours now is, there are many 
more occasions for conflict between the government and religious believers.”). 
 140. Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 
131 (2016); see also Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015). 
 141. For a discussion of individualism, by which Tocqueville meant a kind of 
withdrawal from and indifference to the affairs of other citizens, see DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.ii.2, at 482–84. 
 142. “The inhabitant of the United States learns from birth that he must rely on 
himself to struggle against the evils and obstacles of life; he has only a defiant and 
restive regard for social authority and appeals to its power only when he cannot 
do without it.” Id. I.ii.4, at 180. 
 143. See id. at II.iv.1; id. at II.iv.3. 
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everyone would not only be thinkable but necessary.144 Of the 
citizen in an egalitarian democracy, Tocqueville wrote: 
His independence fills him with confidence and pride 
among his equals, and his debility makes him feel, from time 
to time, the need of the outside help that he cannot expect 
from any of them, since they are all impotent and cold. In 
this extremity, he naturally turns his regard to the immense 
being that rises in the midst of universal debasement. His 
needs and above all his desires constantly lead him back 
toward it, and in the end he views it as the unique and 
necessary support for individual weakness.145 
Only a powerful state has the ability to protect and provide for 
the individual who has abandoned traditional sources of 
belonging and authority. 
Tocqueville thought that American democracy overcame this 
tendency to statism through its commitment to private 
associations, including religious associations, which provided 
competing sources of loyalty that kept the state in check.146 But, 
over time, a democratic state will find such associations a 
threat and try to weaken them, all in the interests of human 
flourishing.147 As Patrick Deneen writes, the logic of liberal 
democracy requires an activist state that breaks the hold of 
traditional authorities in order to promote a salutary personal 
autonomy. Individualism and the activist state thus reinforce 
one another—“a virtuous circle,” from the perspective of 
liberalism.148 In Tocqueville’s words, the state willingly works 
for each individual’s happiness, asking in return only the 
authority to “knead him as it likes” and have the final say on 
what happiness shall mean.149 
In short, over time, a democratic state will tend to promote 
the “equality as sameness” principle through its administrative 
apparatus. The state will encourage people to think of 
                                                                                                      
 144. See id. at II.iv.3. 
 145. Id. at II.iv.3, at 644 (footnote omitted). 
 146. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 14. 
 147. See DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.ii.4, at 485 (“Despotism, 
which in its nature is fearful, sees the most certain guarantee of its own duration 
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also Movsesian, supra note 12, at 14. 
 148. DENEEN, supra note 93, at 59. 
 149. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.iv.6, at 663. 
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themselves only as citizens and abandon traditional sources of 
identity that distinguish them.150 It will work to break down the 
social boundaries that groups, including the Traditionally 
Religious, erect to maintain their distinctiveness and preserve 
their values. Indeed, as Philip Hamburger writes, in 
contemporary America, it is the small-o “orthodox” who need 
most to worry about government action—those “minorities 
that seek to preserve their distinctive beliefs in the face of 
majoritarian pressures to conform to more universal liberal 
views.”151 In a society like ours, which prizes equality and 
which deeply suspects tradition and communal authority, 
“orthodoxy” is itself “unorthodox,”152 even when people 
voluntarily choose it, and therefore occasions serious conflicts 
that our courts ultimately must resolve. 
In twenty-first century America, this dynamic appears in 
various actions by government agencies that impinge on 
traditional religious associations and identities. Government 
has always impinged on the activities of religious associations 
in America to some degree, of course, going back to the early 
Republic.153 But the potential for conflict has become much 
larger today. The Traditionally Religious face an expanding set 
of rules and policies that promote new understandings of 
equality, particularly with respect to sexuality and gender, 
along with an ever-expanding bureaucracy dedicated to 
enforcing them.154 As Richard Epstein writes, civil rights offices 
exist today “in virtually every government agency, most 
notably in the agencies that regulate housing, education, and 
                                                                                                      
 150. Cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 615 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“A Christian, a Jew, a Muslim (and so forth)—each stands in the same 
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 152. Id.  
 153. See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church 
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 154. On the centrality of sexuality in contemporary conflicts over religious 
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employment.”155 The Traditionally Religious face increasing 
pressure to accept the new understandings and comply with 
the new rules, or face a “looming threat of a wide range of legal 
sanctions.”156 
Masterpiece Cakeshop offers a good example. The Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission ruled against Jack Phillips in order to 
promote equality for same-sex marriage, a concept that 
relatively few would have endorsed even a decade ago, even 
on the progressive left.157 It imposed significant regulatory 
burdens on him, including training and quarterly reporting 
requirements that would have demanded significant time and 
money.158 One commissioner even hinted that, with views like 
his, maybe Phillips should think about doing business in a 
different state.159 Phillips decided to resist. But not many 
businesses will do so. Not many will be willing to bear such 
burdens or to relocate. The more likely result will be that 
Traditionally Religious businesspeople like Phillips abandon, 
or at least soften, their convictions in order to make a living. Of 
course, the commissioners were trying to promote human 
flourishing and protect gay couples from indignities in the 
marketplace; that is not the point. The point is that in imposing 
these burdens, the Commission acted in a way calculated to 
advance the principle of equality as sameness and weaken the 
hold of traditional religious commitments. As Rod Dreher 
writes, we can anticipate many more such conflicts in the 
future.160 
                                                                                                      
 155. Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An 
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 159. Id. at 1729. 
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III. CONCLUSION: AFTER MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
In short, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects important cultural and 
political trends. Those trends will continue to shape future 
conflicts between anti-discrimination norms, on the one hand, 
and religious freedom, on the other—disputes, to paraphrase 
Justice Kennedy, which set the right of gays and lesbians to 
obtain goods and services in the marketplace without 
experiencing affronts against the right of religious persons to 
have their sincere beliefs respected by our government.161 In the 
space remaining, I would like to offer three predictions for 
what may lie ahead. 
First, conflicts like the one in Masterpiece Cakeshop will 
become more frequent and harder for our society to negotiate. 
The “equality as sameness” principle has expanded to cover 
sexual identity and behavior in a way few foresaw even a 
decade ago.162 The principle continues to expand, driven by its 
own inner logic. As Adrian Vermeule observes, the “triumph 
of same-sex marriage” has been “followed . . . rapidly by the 
opening of a new regulatory and juridical frontier, the 
recognition of transgender identity.”163 Indeed, shortly after 
Jack Phillips won his case at the Supreme Court, the Colorado 
Civil Rights Division found probable cause that he had again 
violated CADA, this time by refusing to create a cake for a 
customer who wished to celebrate the anniversary of her 
coming out as transgender.164 Phillips then filed an action for an 
injunction against the Colorado authorities, again alleging a 
violation of his constitutional rights.165 The state ultimately 
decided not to pursue the case against Phillips as part of a 
                                                                                                      
 161. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 162. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 13, at 173–74 (discussing the rapid change in 
public acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage). 
 163. Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism 
[https://perma.cc/WT2N-B2A9]. 
 164. See Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo. 
Civil Rights Div. June 28, 2018) (probable cause determination), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceCakeshopProbableCause Determination.
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settlement agreement.166 But it seems likely that the courts will 
soon need to decide whether vendors have a free exercise right 
to decline to provide services for transgender coming out 
ceremonies.  
The new understanding of sexual identity and behavior has 
become a flash point in our culture wars. Nones, especially 
younger Nones, embrace the new understanding,167 as do 
regulatory agencies, which seek to promote it in American 
life.168 But the Traditionally Religious, who remain 
comparatively numerous, continue to oppose it. Some of them, 
at least, will continue to resist government efforts to enforce it. 
That each side in the conflict cares deeply about the outcome, 
and finds the other’s position increasingly unfamiliar and 
offensive, will make compromise much more difficult.169 
It is true that the Traditionally Religious may themselves 
come to accept the new understanding over time. According to 
the Pew survey I quoted earlier, acceptance of homosexuality 
does appear to be “growing rapidly even among religious 
groups” that traditionally have “strongly opposed” same-sex 
relations.170 If the Traditionally Religious were to accept the 
new understanding of sexuality, conflicts like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop would fade from view, much as conflicts over serving 
African-Americans in public places thankfully have 
disappeared from American life. But it seems more likely that 
those Traditionally Religious who accept the new 
understanding will gradually drift away from religion entirely 
and join the Nones. The mainline Protestant denominations 
that have embraced new norms about homosexuality—for 
example, the Episcopalians and Presbyterians171—have 
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continued to experience sharp declines in membership, even as 
membership in conservative churches has remained relatively 
stable.172 Endorsing the new sexual norms has not kept 
believers in the pews. Religious polarization, in other words, 
seems likely to continue. 
Second, the law in this area likely will remain unsettled and 
deeply contested for some time to come, for two reasons. First, 
as I explained earlier, the law of religious exemptions is already 
something of a “patchwork.”173 Different jurisdictions apply 
different tests in different circumstances. For example, for 
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s 1990 decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith indicates that no constitutional 
right to a religious exemption exists where a law is neutral and 
generally applicable.174 In circumstances where the state has 
not shown neutrality towards religion, however, or where a 
law is not generally applicable, a different rule applies under a 
later case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.175 
Before Masterpiece Cakeshop, most commentators understood 
that Lukumi called for the compelling interest test in those 
circumstances: the government could substantially burden 
religious exercise if it had a compelling reason for doing so and 
had chosen the least restrictive means.176 Justice Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                      
staff/files/download/22938 [https://perma.cc/VQ9B-3LY4] (last visited Mar. 9, 
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 173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 174. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 175. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 176. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 51, at 375 (“The Smith/Lukumi rule evaluates 
facially discriminatory laws under a compelling interest test.”). 
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opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests, though, even without 
going through the compelling interest analysis, that the 
government’s failure to act neutrally amounts to a per se 
violation.177 It remains to be seen what the Court will make of 
this suggestion in future cases. 
Federal constitutional doctrine is thus unsettled. With 
respect to federal statutory law, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) requires the compelling interest test,178 
although, as I will explain in a moment, saying that does not 
clarify things too much. With respect to state constitutional and 
statutory law, substantial variation exists.179 Some states apply 
the Smith test as a matter of state constitutional law, while 
others apply some version of the compelling interest test.180 
Some states have adopted a version of RFRA and apply the 
compelling interest test as a matter of state statutory law; some 
do not.181 In short, generalizations are difficult. 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the doctrinal uncertainty, the 
compelling interest test remains the leading test in this area—
under Lukumi, under RFRA and its state analogues, or under 
state constitutional provisions—and will provide the rule of 
decision in most cases in which a vendor seeks a religious 
exemption from anti-discrimination laws. 182 But—and this is 
the second reason for my prediction that the law will remain 
unsettled—the compelling interest test itself is deeply 
indeterminate. It turns on vague concepts that provide little 
guidance in specific cases.183 The test depends almost entirely 
on the intuitions of individual judges, which of course differ 
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greatly.184 In the recent Hobby Lobby case, for example, in which 
plaintiffs sought a religious exemption under RFRA from the 
so-called “contraceptive mandate,” the Justices differed 
strongly among themselves on the meaning and application 
both of “substantial burden” and “least restrictive means.”185 
Indeed, in a society as polarized as ours, how could judges’ 
views on these concepts not differ? Is requiring a Christian 
vendor to provide services on an equal basis for gay and 
straight weddings a substantial burden on the vendor’s 
religion? Does the state have a compelling interest in ending 
discrimination that would justify that burden, even if other 
nearby vendors would readily provide those services? Does the 
state have reasonable alternative measures available to it that 
would burden the vendor’s religious exercise to a lesser 
degree? The answers depend on one’s perception of the nature 
and value of religion, the true meaning of equality, the proper 
scope of government action, and many other factors. The 
questions do not submit to easy, objective criteria on which 
everyone agrees, certainly not in our society, today. In a society 
in which we cannot agree on what is good, how can we agree 
on what is a compelling interest? 
It is possible, of course, that these indeterminacy problems 
will hasten the end of the compelling interest test. The test has 
drawn strong criticism from judges and scholars for decades, 
as far back as the Court’s 1990 Smith decision, which sought to 
do away with the test, or at least to sharply confine it.186 Justices 
Gorsuch and Alito hinted at their disapproval of Smith in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop itself.187 But the test has shown remarkable 
durability. As I have explained, the Court reaffirmed the test, at 
least in some circumstances, only a few terms after Smith, in 
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Lukumi.188 Moreover, in 1993, Congress reinstated the test in 
RFRA, by a unanimous vote in the House and a vote of 97–3 in 
the Senate.189 It is not clear that RFRA would pass today—but it 
is not clear that a vote to repeal it would succeed, either.190 Two 
years ago, in the run-up to the Court’s decision in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Democratic members of Congress introduced the “Do 
No Harm Act,” which sought to amend RFRA to make clear 
that it would not apply to federal anti-discrimination laws.191 
The Do No Harm Act would not have repealed RFRA, only 
limited its application.192 And yet the new act did not attract a 
single Republican cosponsor, in either the House or the 
Senate.193 Repealing, or even amending, RFRA would require a 
bipartisan coalition, and it is difficult to see how a coalition 
could form in our current political environment. 
American politics is becoming more and more polarized on 
the basis of religion—something that has not been true, 
historically.194 Religion is now a strong element of partisan 
identity.195 Today’s Democratic and Republican Parties have 
dramatically different religious profiles. According to a Pew 
survey conducted in 2018, about 70% of Republicans and 
people who lean Republican believe in the God of the Bible—
they are the Traditionally Religious.196 By contrast, only 45% of 
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Democrats and Democratic-leaners say they believe in the God 
of the Bible.197 Another Pew survey revealed that Nones now 
make up the largest “religious” grouping in the Democratic 
Party—about 30 percent.198 To be sure, some progressives are 
religious believers, a group some have called the “Religious 
Left.”199 But this group has relatively little impact within the 
contemporary Democratic Party, and it’s not clear how much 
impact the group will have in the future.200 
In this political environment, a move by one party to tinker 
with RFRA would immediately raise suspicions on the part of 
the other. Achieving agreement on any changes seems unlikely. 
As a result, the compelling interest test seems here to stay. And 
that observation leads to my third and final prediction. 
Masterpiece Caksehop suggests that judicial appointments, 
certainly on the federal level, will become even more heated 
and partisan than they already are. Because the compelling 
interest test is so indeterminate, so dependent on the prior 
commitments of the people doing the judging, the identity of 
the judges is extremely important. Each side in our polarized 
society understands how crucial it is to have judges with the 
“right” intuitions about religion and equality on the bench. 
Each, therefore, will fight long and hard to ensure that such 
judges are appointed—and, conversely, that judges with the 
“wrong” intuitions are not. Having judges with the “wrong” 
intuitions about religion and equality could lead to negative 
outcomes in cases about which both sides care deeply. The 
stakes are too high to be ignored. 
The late Justice Scalia recognized this dynamic long ago, in a 
different context, in his dissent in Planned Parenthood of 
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.201 Because the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence had come to turn on the personal 
values of the Justices, he observed, the electorate had every 
right to focus on nominees’ values during the selection process. 
“[C]onfirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate 
into question-and-answer sessions in which Senators go 
through a list of their constituents’ most favored and most 
disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the 
nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them,” he 
wrote.202 “Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not 
dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidently [sic] 
committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a 
sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put 
forward.”203 For Justice Scalia, interrogating nominees about 
their personal value judgments was a matter for regret. But, 
good or bad, the compelling interest test, which makes judges’ 
value judgments about religion and equality crucial to the 
outcome of a case, creates strong incentives to do so. 
In short, the new religious partisanship will only amplify the 
already intense acrimony over judicial selection. Given their 
religious profiles, the two parties will likely nominate judges 
with very different views on the conflict between anti-
discrimination laws and religious liberty; each party will be 
very wary of the other’s nominees. On the whole, given the 
party’s religious makeup, one would expect Democrats to 
nominate judges with skeptical views of traditional religion—
and therefore, less favorable views on exemptions for the 
Traditionally Religious from anti-discrimination laws. One 
would expect the opposite, on the whole, from judges 
Republican administrations nominate. Again, because 
everyone knows how high the stakes are, the judicial 
confirmation wars will likely be quite passionate and divisive 
for the foreseeable future.  
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* * * 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision. The case turns on 
rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between 
our anti-discrimination laws, on the one hand, and our 
commitment to religious freedom, on the other. But the 
narrowness of the case’s holding is deceptive. In fact, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects very broad cultural and political 
trends that drive those conflicts and shape their resolution: a 
deepening religious polarization between Nones and the 
Traditionally Religious, an expansive understanding of 
equality as sameness, and an activist state dedicated to 
enforcing that understanding in large areas of our common life. 
As everyone knows, law and culture have a mutually 
reinforcing relationship.204 Court rulings influence the way our 
culture perceives social conflicts: which arguments seem 
legitimate and which parties deserve our sympathies. But 
culture, in turn, influences law. I have explored here the 
cultural and political trends that form the backdrop to our 
law’s attempt to resolve our competing commitments to 
equality and to religious freedom. Those trends, which 
Masterpiece Cakeshop so clearly reflects, will continue to shape 
our law for decades to come. 
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